Scapegoat: General Percival of Singapore

by Mr Bernard Loo

Over half a century has passed since the fall of Singapore in February 1942, and still, the Malayan Campaign continues to attract attention in scholarly circles. A recent publication on the Malayan Campaign was Ong Chit Chung's Operation MATADOR: Britain's War Plans Against the Japanese 1918-1941, which was reviewed in an earlier volume of this journal.1 But it is by no means the only examination of this episode of military history.2 Nor is this the first volume that provides a sympathetic treatment of Percival's prosecution of the war effort.3 That this book explores themes which previous authors have already examined is therefore to be expected. There can be previous little new information on the Malayan Campaign that can still be gleaned from a new publication such as this. Certainly this is true for the strategic and tactical issues pertaining to the campaign.

PERCIVAL UNDER THE MICROSCOPE

It is perhaps in the field of biography that the available literature is lacking. Perhaps it is because the taint of defeat, of being involved in what Churchill called the "worst defeat and largest capitulation in British history" that has deterred scholars from examining the biographies of the major characters in this historical melodrama. There is a body of literature that examines issues pertaining to these characters.4 Apart from Tsuji, some of the major characters involved in the Malayan Campaign have also published their perspectives of this episode.5 As one of the two central figures in the Malayan Campaign, Arthur Percival certainly merits scholarly attention.

And in this sense, this book is a welcome addition to the body of literature on the Malayan Campaign. Kinvig traces the career of Arthur Percival, from a volunteer in the Inns of Court regiment Officer Training Corps (OTC) just after the outbreak of World War One, to his bewildering array of senior staff appointments during the early years of World War Two, through to his appointment as General Officer Commanding (GOC) Malaya, his subsequent defeat at the hands of Lieutenant-General Tomoyuki Yamashita and his subsequent incarceration in a Prisoner-of-War Camp. Thereafter Kinvig continues the story of Percival from his release from a POW camp in Korea after Japan's surrender and his presence at the signing of the surrender document by General Douglas MacArthur. It is an interesting and intriguing story, of a talented, intelligent, humane, humble soldier who had the misfortune to preside over Britain's worst defeat in its long military history.

WHO'S TO BLAME?

The essential question is who is to blame for the debacle of the Malayan Campaign? This is a question that continues to generate some degree of controversy. Ong Chit Chung points the finger clearly at Whitehall, particularly the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill.6 It would seem to imply that by Ong's judgement, Percival could not be held to blame for the defeat. Earlier scholars have also hinted at Churchill's culpability; in the process they also suggest that while Percival made tactical errors in his management of the campaign, the overall result cannot be attributed to him alone.7

But the problem of Percival's exoneration remains a thorny issue. There were figures that pointed the finger at Percival for his alleged mismanagement of the defense of Malaya. One such person was Lieutenant-General Lewis Heath, who commanded the III Indian Corps during the Malayan Campaign. Heath remained unhappy over Percival's performance, particularly in the indecision over Operation MATADOR in the first few hours of the Campaign.8 Ivan Simson, who was in charge of civil defense also had some scathing remarks to make about Percival's leadership, particularly over Percival's alleged rejection of Simson's proposal to construct a series of fixed defenses in Johor.9 Percival's critics point to the meeting between Simson and Percival, held on 26 December 1941 at about 11.30 PM, in which Simson relayed to Percival Heath's request for a series of defenses in Johor; Percival's reason for his rejection was "Defenses are bad for morale - for both troops and civilians."10

Kinvig points out that Percival was not alone in his opposition to fixed defenses on the basis of morale. In mid-January 1942, the Supreme Commander, General Wavell, issued instructions to Percival to begin defense preparations in the northern coastline of Singapore, with the added instruction that these preparations be kept "entirely secret . . . make it clear to everyone that battle is to be fought out in Johor without thought of retreat."11 In other words, Kinvig suggests that Percival's objections to fixed defenses on the basis of morale were entirely valid.

In similar vein, Kinvig attempts to show how the tactical reversals could not always be attributed to Percival. Whereas Kirby criticizes Percival's disposition of forces on the eve of the campaign,12 Kinvig argues that in spreading Malayan Command's forces to defend the many airfields in northern Malaya, Percival was not entirely wrong. Percival, Kinvig argues, had every reason to believe the assurances that British air power in Malaya would be built up, that even without reinforcement, existing Royal Air Force resources were sufficient to cope with a Japanese invasion. The Jitra battle, some historians argue, should never have been fought, precisely because its rear was under threat from the Patani-Kroh axis. Percival therefore should have fought the Japanese further south, perhaps at Gurun (which had the added attraction of better anti-tank ground). Percival's handling of the Singapore battle also comes under intense criticism from historians, who point out that Wavell had accurately predicted the location of the Japanese attack, but which Percival had disagreed.

PERCIVAL EXONERATED?

How does Kinvig attempt to answer these charges? In the case of the Jitra battle, Kinvig argues that Percival was aware that Jitra was not ideal country for a defense against the Japanese, but he had to fight there due to circumstances beyond his control.13 Kinvig points also to the poor quality of the forces under Percival's command, in contrast to the "excellent fighting machine"14 which Percival faced. More importantly, Kinvig points out that Percival had to satisfy two requirements - the need to preserve British forces in Malaya, and the need to hold onto the Malayan peninsula long enough for the reinforcements promised to arrive in Singapore. For these reinforcements to arrive, the Japanese had to be denied use of the airfields in central Malaya for as long as possible.

Kinvig also points out that Percival was further hampered by the intervention of his Supreme Commander. For instance, the errors of the Johor battle can be partly attributed to Wavell's unfortunate intervention in assigning the key western sector the Gordon Bennett, the Australian commanding 8th Australian Division; his 27th Brigade at Gemas would be augmented with Heath's 9th Indian Division and the newly arrived 45th Indian Brigade. This was in contrast to Percival's original plan to give the key western sector to Heath's III Corps. Wavell's intervention was unfortunate because it allotted the key western sector to a commander who was totally unfamiliar with Japanese fighting methods, created difficult administrative problems for Bennett who had to incorporate 3 additional brigades into his force structure without the necessary manpower in his headquarters to properly manage this force. There was the additional problem of the disposition of forces - Wavell had ordered a lateral defense, whereas a defense-in-depth might have had greater success against the Japanese. But the biggest error was in allotting the key western coast sector to the 45th Indian Brigade. It was newly arrived, totally unacclimatised, and was under-equipped and under-trained.

It is, of course, difficult to determine if Percival's preferred disposition of forces, where III Corps would defend the western sector in depth, would have had greater success. This is pure speculation, and not terribly useful for our purposes. Of greater significance was Percival's behaviour. Instead of arguing his case to his Supreme Commander, Percival had meekly accepted this plan. The historical record shows that Wavell was wrong - indeed it was a miracle that the 45th Brigade lasted as long as it did against the Imperial Guards, in the process buying time for 27th Brigade and 9th Indian Division to withdraw from Gemas after the coastal flank had been turned.

CONCLUSION

In the end the reader has to ask one question - has Kinvig successfully vindicated Percival? Sadly the answer, at least in the opinion of this writer, is no. Percival cannot be held to blame for the poor quality of his forces - much, if not all, of the blame has to go to Whitehall. This is, perhaps, the strongest argument for Percival's vindication. Kinvig hints at Whitehall's culpability, but this is never made as explicitly clear as Ong Chit Chung did. Kinvig's defense of Percival's performance during the campaign itself is also weak. It is true that Percival was often fighting the campaign under extremely adverse conditions - the problems in his relationship with his subordinate commanders, the problems he faced in dealing with the Colonial Governor and his office, the problems he face with his Supreme Commander. But does that exonerate Percival?

Perhaps what Percival needed to do was to be more forceful. It is true that these relationships were a constant problem and hindrance to Percival in his attempt to fight the Malayan Campaign, and it would be tempting to speculate what the end result could have been had Percival dealt with these problems in a more forceful manner. The fact, however, is that he failed to tackle these problems, that he allowed these problems to fester throughout the campaign and distract his attention from the more pressing matter of defending the peninsula and the island.

That being said, Kinvig has added a new dimension to the existing literature on the Malayan Campaign, and deserves it place in this body of literature. This writer can sympathize with Percival, and although Kinvig does not vindicate Percival successfully, he has at least showed the conditions under which Percival had to fight. Perhaps no commander could have saved the Malayan Campaign; certainly Percival was unable to. Whether history will eventually see Percival in a more positive light, however, remains to be seen.